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  REMEDYING RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING: 
RECLAIMING THE REMEDIAL FOCUS OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
John V. Wintermute* 
  
“Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful discrimination 
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no 
such thing as either a creditor or debtor race.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,2 in which 
the Supreme Court “added a wrinkle” to a college or university’s 
ability to craft a race-conscious admissions policy,3 American schools 
have been left with a tentative legal underpinning for their 
affirmative action programs.4  In light of the uncertainty created by 
Fisher, this Comment seeks to inject some perspective into the debate 
and to provide colleges and universities with another potential 
foundation upon which to pursue a race-conscious admissions policy.  
Specifically, this Comment argues: (1) that the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of racial discrimination as “race-based decision-making” 
encompasses many forms of unequal treatment likely experienced by 
a Black college applicant during his or her educational career; and 
(2) that the Court’s race-conscious remedy jurisprudence permits a 
school to account for the presence of the resultant discriminatory 
effects in its applicant pool. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a 1965 address at Howard 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2011, The College 
of New Jersey.  I would like to thank Professor Rachel Godsil for her invaluable 
insight and guidance throughout the writing process. 
 1  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 2  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 3  Joy Resmovits, Fisher v. University of Texas At Austin Ruling Leaves Universities 
In Limbo, HUFFPOST POLITICS (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/24/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin 
-ruling_n_3434687.html (quoting a statement by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund). 
 4  Id. 
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University, delivered his stance on the moral imperative of affirmative 
action: “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race 
and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still 
justly believe that you have been completely fair.”5  This broad, 
societal view of race-consciousness, though justifiably informed by our 
country’s egregious history of race relations, seems to advocate for 
something akin to designating “a creditor or debtor race”—the 
skeptical language employed by Associate Justice Antonin Scalia in 
his opposition to a minority set-aside program for government 
contracts.6  The philosophical tension underlying these positions is 
readily apparent, and is manifest in the fierce public debate 
surrounding race-conscious remedies.  Both statements, however, 
appear to presume that discrimination is a thing of the past, and thus 
misunderstand the proper scope of race-based remedial action in the 
twenty-first century.  Although America’s state-enforced systems of 
slavery, segregation, and Jim Crow have undoubtedly created 
extensive racial injustices that still persist today, it is contemporary 
racial discrimination that race-conscious remedies are best equipped 
to address. 
Properly devised race-conscious policies, aimed at remedying the 
effects of identified discrimination, are far less ideological than 
Justice Scalia might suggest.  Race-conscious policies, accurately 
understood, are practical mechanisms by which competent 
governmental entities can identify contemporary instances of 
unlawful discrimination, and undertake affirmative measures to 
ensure that the effects of such practices are not publicly subsidized 
and perpetuated.7  Indeed, the Supreme Court has unambiguously 
allowed public entities, in appropriate circumstances, to identify 
effects of current racial discrimination and to undertake policies that 
will alleviate or account for them.8  Rather than utilizing racial 
preference as an embarrassingly futile attempt to apologize for past 
 
 5  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: 
To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965). 
 6  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 7  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“The State 
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating 
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”). 
 8  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (“Nothing 
we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects 
of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction.”). 
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societal discrimination, constitutionally permissible race-conscious 
measures are carefully crafted to actually remedy identified 
discrimination. 
In the higher education context, colleges and universities have a 
compelling interest in preventing racial discrimination from tainting 
their applicant pools by artificially depressing the standard measures 
of Black candidates for admission.  In order to remedy these effects, 
admissions officers can and should conduct admissions procedures 
with an informed understanding of the ways in which racial 
discrimination often shapes the educational playing field, and utilize 
a holistic, race-conscious review of an applicant in order to admit 
candidates in accordance with this reality.  In this way, schools are not 
“‘mak[ing] up’ for past racial discrimination”;9 rather, they are 
accounting for the effects of current discrimination in their pools of 
applicants. 
Although the need for a race-conscious remedy remains strong, 
the need for a remedially-focused argument largely dissipated with 
the Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.10  In Grutter, the majority 
sanctioned the University of Michigan’s holistic use of race, and 
found a compelling governmental interest in educational diversity.11  
The Grutter Court’s focus on diversity was not new; Regents of University 
of California v. Bakke had already accepted the premise of the diversity 
interest back in 1978, while rejecting the University of California’s 
other asserted interests, including “countering the effects of societal 
discrimination.”12  Over time, it apparently became clear to schools 
that the diversity interest was the easiest road to travel, enough so that 
the University of Michigan did not even assert a compelling interest 
aside from diversity.13 
With its decision in Fisher, however, a case involving a 
constitutional challenge to the University of Texas’s (“UT”) race-
conscious admissions policy, the Supreme Court has created 
uncertainty over the continued permissibility of affirmative action in 
pursuit of educational diversity.14  And because UT chose not to assert 
 
 9  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 10  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 11  Id. at 343. 
 12  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306–15. 
 13  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28. 
 14  This Comment does not evaluate the merits of the diversity interest, nor does 
it analyze the Supreme Court’s holding in the Fisher case.  The background of Fisher is 
discussed below, infra Part IV, but is used only to provide a context in which to 
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an interest in remedying the effects of identified discrimination, one 
of the most firmly established justifications for the consideration of 
race,15 the school’s entire policy hinges on the diversity interest.  
Although UT is not alone in its neglect of the remedial 
underpinnings of race-conscious admissions, moving forward it is 
imperative that colleges and universities recognize the strength of the 
governmental interest in remedying the effects of identified 
discrimination.  Remedying identified discrimination is not only a 
compelling interest that can support the government’s modest use of 
race as an admission criterion, it also serves as a reminder that racial 
minorities often still face race-based, unequal treatment in education, 
employment, criminal justice, and numerous other areas. 
In the last fifty years, rates of explicit racial prejudice have 
declined sharply.16  As a general rule, it is no longer considered 
socially acceptable to harbor conscious animus toward Blacks and 
other minorities.17  Despite the triumph of egalitarianism in public 
opinion polls, significant racial disparities still permeate nearly every 
aspect of Americans’ economic, social, and political lives.18  These 
overwhelming inequalities are undoubtedly linked to the United 
States’ history of slavery and state-enforced racial hierarchies, but 
progress toward parity is equally hampered by contemporary forms of 
discrimination and racial bias.  Inherent biases and racial anxieties 
repeatedly lead to imbalanced racial outcomes—Blacks are less likely 
to be given an interview based on their resume,19 more likely to be 
sentenced to death in capital trials,20 and more likely to receive 
 
demonstrate the potential of the remedial interest. 
 15  See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (“[W]e have never held that the only 
governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past 
discrimination.”) (emphasis added). 
 16  See, e.g., Race Relations, GALLUP.COM, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1687/race-
relations.aspx#1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (comparing the approval rates of 
interracial marriage over time: 4% in 1958 and 86% in 2011). 
 17  See BERNARD E. WHITLEY, JR. & MARY E. KITE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND 
DISCRIMINATION 372 (Jane Potter et al., eds., 2d ed. 2010) (showing that 92% of poll 
participants approve of prejudice against racists). 
 18  See generally, Lassiter Racial Disparity Statistics, LAW.UKY.EDU,  
http://www.law.uky.edu/files/docs/misc/LassiterRacialDisparityStatistics.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
 19  Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment On Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991 (2004). 
 20  David C. Baldus & James W. L. Cole, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 
(1980). 
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inadequate medical treatment for serious diseases.21  Although the 
effects of implicit biases would be difficult to prove in a given 
situation, the consistency with which Black men and women receive 
different treatment suggests that those decisions are sometimes 
influenced by race.  In other words, if they were White instead of 
Black, they likely would not have been turned down for an interview, 
sentenced to death, or given inadequate medical care. 
In the educational context specifically, Black students in 
kindergarten through twelfth grade (“K-12”) routinely face common 
forms of disparate treatment, perpetrated by teachers, guidance 
counselors, and other state actors.22  Although this discrimination is 
not usually rooted in malice or a desire to cause harm, it is 
intentional, as defined by the Supreme Court—Black students are 
often treated quite differently as a durect result of their race.23  In 
each situation where a teacher is motivated by race to give artificially 
positive feedback to the poorly written work of a Black student,24 or 
fails to warn him or her about a difficult course of study,25 perhaps 
out of a desire not to appear prejudiced, that student has suffered 
unconstitutional racial discrimination.  The scientifically 
demonstrated prevalence of such “race-based decisionmaking”26 
provides a “strong basis in evidence”27 of constitutional violations.  
The robust evidence of racial discrimination in K-12 schools, 
combined with its inevitable effects on the standard measures used by 
colleges in evaluating incoming candidates, makes necessary the 
modest consideration of race in university admissions.  The 
understandable desire to account for these discriminatory effects, 
and to avoid reinforcing them, gives rise to a college or university’s 
compelling interest in the narrowly-tailored use of race.28 
 
 21  Janice A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes about Race and 
Quality of Medical Care, 46 MED. CARE 678 (2008). 
 22  See, e.g., Jennifer Randall Crosby & Benoit Monin, Failure to Warn: How Student 
Race Affects Warnings of Potential Academic Difficulty, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
663 (2007); Kent D. Harber, Feedback to Minorities: Evidence of a Positive Bias, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 622 (1998). 
 23  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009) (finding intentional 
discrimination based on action taken “solely because the [plaintiffs] were white”). 
 24  Harber, supra note 22, at 622. 
 25  Crosby & Monin, supra note 22, at 663. 
 26  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579. 
 27  See id. at 582–85. 
 28  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (permitting 
affirmative measures by an entity seeking to avoid becoming a “passive participant in 
a system of racial exclusion”). 
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Part II of this Comment addresses the necessary first step in 
justifying the use of a race-conscious remedy—a finding that 
intentional discrimination has occurred.  Part II discusses the 
Supreme Court’s present view of discriminatory intent, and 
demonstrates that any instance of “race-based decisionmaking” 
constitutes an instance of intentional discrimination.  It uses Ricci v. 
DeStefano29 to delineate the precise scope of the Supreme Court’s 
current understanding of discriminatory intent and to explain that 
no malice or intent to harm is required for a constitutional violation.  
Part II then discusses the persisting evidentiary obstacles to a showing 
of discriminatory intent, but explains that many of these problems 
are inapplicable to race-conscious remedy doctrine.  Lastly, Part II 
introduces various psychological studies that document some types of 
race-based decision-making that constitute intentional 
discrimination. 
Part III of this Comment analyzes the text and the tenets of the 
Supreme Court’s limits upon race-conscious governmental policies.  
Specifically, it discusses the Court’s treatment of race-conscious 
admissions and examines the reasons behind the contemporary 
reliance on a diversity justification for such programs.  More broadly, 
it explores the Court’s imprecise guidelines for affirmative state 
action aimed at addressing the effects of discrimination.  Part III then 
explains that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area can best be 
understood as a desire to frame remedial justifications in a present 
context.  That is, by requiring identified discrimination and a 
showing that race-conscious measures are necessary to alleviate or 
account for its effects, the Court has tried to ensure that state actors 
are not using racial distinctions to remedy ideological wrongs from 
the past, but only to account for legitimate racial differences and 
disadvantages caused as a result of unlawful discrimination.  The end 
of Part III synthesizes the Supreme Court’s limitations on race-
conscious remedies into a practical definition and outlines the 
necessary steps in crafting a race-conscious policy that comports with 
the language and the spirit of the Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence. 
Part IV of this Comment introduces the circumstances 
surrounding the Fisher controversy, highlights its importance for the 
future of race-conscious admissions, and notes its lack of focus on 
remedial justifications for UT’s race-conscious admissions program.  
 
 29  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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Part V then presents a hypothetical argument within the factual 
context of Fisher, using the constitutional framework and the 
principles derived from Parts II and III; in so doing it demonstrates 
that all public colleges and universities have a compelling interest in 
remedying identified discrimination and its effects.  Part VI 
concludes, and reiterates the need to develop an informed response 
to the unique, race-based barriers faced by minority students. 
II. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AS RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING 
As a prerequisite to any race-conscious remedy, the 
governmental entity enacting the measure must have a “strong basis 
in evidence” that statutory or constitutional violations have 
occurred,30 and the Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis made 
clear that discriminatory purpose—discriminatory intent—is the 
“touchstone” of Equal Protection analysis.31  Although there are 
certain statutory contexts where discriminatory intent is not a 
mandatory component of a violation,32 a person’s Equal Protection 
rights are not violated without a showing that the wrongdoer acted 
with discriminatory purpose.33  In order to implement a race-
conscious remedy, therefore, it is first necessary to accurately define 
“discriminatory intent” and determine whether this intentional 
discrimination can indeed be shown in a given context.  These 
inquiries require an examination of the Supreme Court’s approach 
in cases involving both explicit racial classifications and actions 
alleged to have racial motivations. 
Over the last thirty years, the Court’s treatment of racial 
classifications and race-motivated actions has been anything but 
static.34  One of the most recent twists in the road was Ricci, in which 
the Court severely limited the ability of employers to pursue 
compliance with Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions.35  Ricci was a 
 
 30  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 279 (1986). 
 31  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1986). 
 32  See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577 (“Title VII prohibits both intentional 
discrimination . . . as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to 
discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities . . . .”). 
 33  Washington, 426 U.S. at 245. 
 34  Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (noting that Congress 
must be afforded “appropriate deference” when it uses racial criteria to pursue equal 
protection goals) and Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990) (noting 
that “benign race-conscious measures” are only subjected to intermediate scrutiny), 
with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial 
classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”). 
 35  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585. 
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casualty of the Court’s increasing hostility toward explicit racial 
decision-making and is generally viewed by proponents of race-
consciousness as a discouraging development in labor law.36  But in 
the course of its decision, the Court also held that the White plaintiffs 
had suffered disparate treatment37—a finding that necessarily 
includes a discriminatory intent component, and therefore carries 
implications far beyond the scope of Title VII and actually provides 
promise for civil rights plaintiffs generally.  With its quick disposition 
of the disparate-treatment claim, the Court has solidified its position 
on the true meaning of discriminatory intent—by making clear that 
intentional discrimination occurs whenever a decision is motivated by 
race, regardless of the presence or absence of malice.38 
The race-based decision-making formulation of discriminatory 
intent possesses significance for a variety of doctrinal areas, but its 
implications for race-conscious remedies provide the most promise.  
A wide scope of non-malicious, racially-driven behavior is largely 
indistinguishable from Ricci’s “race-based decisionmaking” standard, 
and thus amounts to intentional discrimination in any instance where 
it could be proven.  Although these less conspicuous racial 
motivations may be difficult to identify in individual situations, race-
conscious remedies need not identify specific instances of 
discrimination, so long as a “strong basis in evidence” can be 
established,39 and therefore, proponents of race-conscious remedies 
stand to gain significantly from the Court’s broadened view of 
intentional discrimination. 
A. Ricci and the “Race-Based Decisionmaking” Standard 
In Ricci, the Supreme Court declared that race-based action, 
taken in an effort to avoid disparate-impact liability under Title VII, is 
itself “impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can 
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the 
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”40  The initial claim was filed by a group comprised primarily 
of White candidates for officer positions within the fire department 
 
 36  See, e.g., Michael Subit, A Plaintiffs’ Employment Lawyer’s Perspective on Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2010). 
 37  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579. 
 38  Id. at 579–80. 
 39  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). 
 40  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
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of New Haven, Connecticut (the “City”).41  The suit alleged that the 
City had violated the disparate-treatment section of Title VII when it 
threw out the results of a job-related examination, which would have 
provided the basis for certain promotions, but which produced 
results that were heavily skewed along racial lines.42  Faced with the 
threat of a disparate-impact Title VII lawsuit if it certified the results 
and the threat of a disparate-treatment lawsuit if it refused, the City 
eventually sided with the opponents of the test and threw out the 
results.43 
The Court began its analysis with the premise that the “City’s 
actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII 
absent some valid defense.”44  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy proceeded to evaluate the City’s affirmative defense of 
avoiding disparate-impact liability under the newly proscribed 
“strong-basis-in-evidence” standard.45  Finding that the City had 
produced legally insufficient evidence of potential disparate-impact 
liability, the Court held that the standard was not met, and therefore 
that the City had no valid defense for the allegations of disparate-
treatment.46  The Court remanded for an entry of summary judgment 
for the plaintiffs on their Title VII claim, avoiding the need to discuss 
any underlying constitutional issues raised by the case.47 
When the Court issued Ricci in 2009, it was technically a pro-
employee Title VII ruling, but it was met with criticism and pessimism 
from plaintiffs’ employment attorneys and pro-Title VII 
commentators.48  Much of the critical analysis rightfully focused upon 
the implications for disparate-impact litigation and for the ability of 
employers to take race-conscious measures in pursuit of racial parity.49  
A number of commentators, however, have focused their attention 
upon the possible repercussions of Ricci in the area of disparate-
 
 41  Id. at 562–63. 
 42  Id. at 562. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. at 579. 
 45  Id. at 580. The “strong basis in evidence” standard was newly proscribed only 
in this specific context—it was imported from constitutional race-conscious remedy 
analysis, to which it had applied for years.  Id. 
 46  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592. 
 47  Id. at 593. 
 48  See, e.g., Subit, supra note 36, at 211 (“Ricci is the epitome of a pyrrhic victory 
for employees.”). 
 49  See, e.g., Subit, supra note 36. 
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treatment litigation.50  In determining that the Ricci plaintiffs had 
suffered disparate-treatment as a matter of law, the Court embraced a 
definition of discriminatory intent that might actually benefit those 
representing disadvantaged racial classes and other minority groups. 
Scholars have raised the latter observation because of the swift 
and certain premise with which the Ricci Court began its analysis: that 
the City’s act of throwing out the test results violated the disparate-
treatment prohibition of Title VII—as a matter of law—absent a valid 
defense.51  The premise is critical because of what a disparate-
treatment claim must include—a finding that the defendant had a 
discriminatory intent or motive for taking the job-related action.52  
The majority found conclusively that the element of discriminatory 
intent was satisfied by the City’s “express, race-based 
decisionmaking.”53  More importantly, it found irrelevant the 
ostensibly “well intentioned or benevolent” aim of the City—what 
mattered was that the decision was made “solely because the higher 
scoring candidates were white.”54  In other words, once it was 
determined that the decision was made “because of race,” the inquiry 
was over, and the City had committed intentional discrimination.55 
Although Ricci is a Title VII case, and the Supreme Court 
avoided addressing any constitutional issues in the decision,56 
comparisons between equal protection jurisprudence and Ricci’s 
approach to Title VII are inescapable.57  Indeed, the majority derived 
its strong-basis-in-evidence standard from Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,58 
an Equal Protection Clause case involving the remedying of past 
 
 50  See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious 
Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences?, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257; Kerri Lynn Stone, 
Ricci Glitch? The Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LOY. L. REV. 
751 (2009). 
 51  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579. 
 52  Id. at 577 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 
(1988)). 
 53  See id. at 579–80. 
 54  Id. at 580. This phrase might seem a little odd, given the complex and lengthy 
decision-making process leading to the action at issue. After all, is it really “solely 
because the higher scoring candidates were white,” or does it have more to do with 
the race of the lower scoring candidates? A more helpful way of viewing this 
statement, especially within the context of the argument to follow, might be: “but 
for” the employees’ race, they would not have suffered the adverse job action. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 593. 
 57  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582 (“Our cases discussing constitutional principles can 
provide helpful guidance in this statutory context.”). 
 58  488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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discrimination through race-conscious measures.59  Further, the 
requirement of discriminatory intent appears in both the statutory 
and constitutional contexts, and Ricci’s definition of intentional 
discrimination is consistent with the Court’s approach in the 
constitutional arena.  Ricci, therefore, carries implications for 
doctrinal areas outside of Title VII, and provides a broadly applicable 
clarification of the Court’s outlook on discriminatory intent. 
B. Constitutional Implications: “Intent to Harm” vs. “Race-Based 
Decisionmaking” 
In 1979, the Supreme Court faced a gender discrimination 
challenge to a statutory hiring preference for veterans.60  The 
resulting decision, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the policy intentionally 
discriminated against women,61 and has been viewed as defining 
intentional discrimination as something approaching malice, or 
“intent to harm.”62  Commentators have observed a quasi-bifurcation 
of discriminatory intent doctrine by the Court in recent years, noting 
a stark contrast in approach between discrimination claims that 
involve an explicit racial classification and those that do not.63  In 
reality, the vastly different treatment of the two types of challenged 
actions stems from procedural issues, rather than divergent 
definitions of what discriminatory intent actually means.  For this 
reason, the Court’s view of the substantive component of 
discriminatory intent is far less restrictive than many scholars believe.  
The illusory nature of the “intent to harm” standard is plainly 
demonstrated by the disposition in Ricci. Ricci’s expressed paradigm 
of “race-based decisionmaking” is more consistent with the Court’s 
recent jurisprudence and should be considered the prevailing 
benchmark against which claims of intentional discrimination must 
be measured. 
1. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 
Feeney involved a challenge to a Massachusetts civil service hiring 
 
 59  See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582. 
 60  Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
 61  Id. at 280. 
 62  See, e.g., Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1833–
37 (2012). 
 63  Id. at 1831–33. 
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policy that granted almost absolute preference to veterans.64  The 
Court confronted the question of whether the hiring preference 
discriminated against women, because more than 98 percent of 
veterans at that time were men.65  Arguing that the gender 
consequences of the law could not have been truly “unintended,” the 
plaintiffs asserted that the policy intentionally discriminated on the 
basis of gender, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.66  The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart, found that the plaintiff 
had failed to show that the policy had the purpose of discriminating 
against women.67 
As understood by Justice Stewart, discriminatory intent involves 
more than a mere volitional act, or an act with knowledge of the 
consequences.68  Discriminatory intent requires that the decision-
maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in 
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.”69  Some commentators have understood this 
standard, logically enough, to require something akin to malice—that 
an actor must seek to harm a protected class through its actions.70 
The “intent to harm” standard, coupled with the increasing 
difficulty of proving actual intent through contextual evidence, 
served to eliminate many potential equal protection claims, and 
discouraged proponents of strong civil rights enforcement.71  
Although Feeney clearly signifies a purpose-driven analysis for 
intentional discrimination claims, it has become subsequently and 
equally clear that a “purpose” need not be malicious in nature.  
Feeney, often understood as establishing an “intent to harm” standard, 
simply established the requirement that the harm suffered must 
result from a decision with a racial or gendered purpose.  This 
reading of Feeney is more consistent with the Court’s subsequent 
treatment of race-based action, and is made unmistakable by the 
result in Ricci. 
 
 64  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259. 
 65  Id. at 270. 
 66  Id. at 278. 
 67  Id. at 281. 
 68  Id. at 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977)). 
 69  Id. 
 70  Haney-Lopez, supra note 62, at 1833–37. 
 71  Id. 
WINTERMUTE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2014  12:07 PM 
2014] COMMENT 569 
 
2. “Race-Based Decisionmaking” 
As evident in Ricci, the proper standard for evaluating claims of 
intentional discrimination is “race-based decisionmaking.”72  
Intentional discrimination occurs whenever someone is treated “‘less 
favorably than others because of’ a protected trait.”73  The only 
question to be answered in determining if a particular action was 
racially discriminatory, therefore, is whether the decision was made 
because of race.74  Although this malice-irrelevant standard of intent 
seems inconsistent with certain language in Feeney, which suggests 
that a challenged action must be taken “at least in part ‘because 
of’ . . . its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,”75 Ricci simply 
clarifies that Feeney’s distinction lies between actions taken “because 
of” and “in spite of” a protected trait and that a desire to cause harm 
is not truly a necessary component of intentional discrimination.76 
At an instinctive level, it does not seem possible that the Court 
found an implied “intent to harm” within the context of Ricci.  
Whether the City’s motivations were based upon a desire to avoid 
disparate-impact litigation, or out of a more egalitarian desire to 
achieve racial parity within the fire department, the Court found no 
evidence of malice toward the White firefighters.77  It cannot be 
reasonably said that the City discarded the test results out of a desire 
to cause harm to White firefighters—although the action was taken 
“because of” their race, it was also surely taken “in spite of” the harm 
caused to them.78  As made clear by the Court, however, “well 
intentioned or benign” underpinnings will not save a racially-driven 
action—even the most benevolent and non-malicious decisions will 
constitute intentional discrimination, so long as they were motivated 
by race.79 
This reading of Ricci is also consistent with a 2003 gender 
discrimination case, Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic.80  In Bray, 
the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff’s claim that anti-abortion 
 
 72  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009). 
 73  Id. at 577 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 
(1988). 
 74  Id. at 579–80. 
 75  Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 76  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579–80. 
 77  See id. at 579 (finding that the City’s act involved discriminatory intent 
regardless of how “well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed”). 
 78  See id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (2003). 
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protesting constituted a conspiracy to intentionally discriminate 
against women as a class.81  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
cited a lack of evidence that the protesters’ demonstrations were 
motivated by any “purpose directed specifically at women.”82  Before 
reaching this conclusion, however, Justice Scalia expressed the scope 
of “animus” necessary for a finding of intentional discrimination: 
We do not think that the “animus” requirement can be met 
only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly 
benign (though objectively invidious), discrimination 
against women.  It does demand, however, at least a 
purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex-for 
example (to use an illustration of assertedly benign 
discrimination), the purpose of “saving” women because they 
are women from a combative, aggressive profession such as 
the practice of law.83 
Justice Scalia’s hypothetical scenario presents exactly the same type of 
action as Ricci—in either case, plaintiffs would have a claim because 
they were treated differently simply because of their race or sex.  Such 
class-based action is “objectively invidious,” and therefore amounts to 
intentional discrimination.84 
Further, this formulation of intent makes plain that race or 
gender discrimination is suffered even by individuals whom a race-
based action is meant to “benefit.”  In Justice Scalia’s scenario, 
women are the victims of gender discrimination even where they are 
supposedly “helped” by a particular decision, and even where a 
decision-maker may be entirely unaware that the distinction actually 
harms women.85  In the racial discrimination context, this proposition 
is expressed through the Court’s hostility toward any use of race, for 
any purpose.86  In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
Dist. No. 1, Justice Thomas’s concurrence reminded that “race-based 
governmental decisionmaking is categorically prohibited” unless it 
fits within the narrow constraints of strict scrutiny.87  In doing so, he 
 
 81  Id. at 268–74. 
 82  Id. at 270. 
 83  Id. at 270. 
 84  Id. 
 85  See id. 
 86  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 720 (2007). 
 87  Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
326 (2003)). 
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noted that racial decision-making “can harm [even] favored races.”88 
C. Ricci’s Significance for Race-Conscious Remedy Doctrine 
Intentional discrimination can best be understood as including 
both procedural and substantive components.  Procedurally, the 
Court has placed significant evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs seeking 
to prove discriminatory intent—both on the amount and the type of 
evidence required for a finding of intent.89  In this area, Ricci has little 
significance—few plaintiffs enjoy the luxury of a defendant that 
proclaims a racial purpose for its actions (except those, of course, 
challenging race-conscious remedies).  Conversely, Ricci sheds 
important light on the substantive definition of intent; it is the 
Court’s treatment of this element that establishes solid constitutional 
ground for race-conscious remedies.  A race-conscious remedy must 
simply be supported by a “strong basis in evidence that remedial 
action was necessary,”90 and need not include proof that any specific 
decision was the product of race-based decision-making.  In other 
words, the usual procedural hurdles in proving discriminatory intent 
are largely irrelevant—and it is for this reason that race-conscious 
remedy doctrine derives the greatest benefits from an expanded 
formulation of the substantive aspect of intent. 
The difference between procedural and substantive proofs of 
intent is well-demonstrated by McCleskey v. Kemp.91  In McCleskey, the 
Court rejected a capitally-sentenced Black convict’s claim that his trial 
was contaminated by racial considerations, and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.92  
His claim rested principally upon a comprehensive analysis of racial 
disparities in death-sentencing at capital trials—called the Baldus 
study—which he argued gave rise to an inference that unlawful 
discrimination had impermissibly tainted his trial.93  The Court 
 
 88  Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353). 
 89  See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294–97 (1987) (holding that 
statistical evidence of discrimination in capital sentencing generally did not give rise 
to an inference of discrimination in the plaintiff’s case); City of Memphis v. Greene, 
451 U.S. 100, 166 (1981) (rejecting as irrelevant historical discrimination used to 
assert a racial motivation for the challenged action); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976) (rejecting the relevancy of disparate impact and announcing 
discriminatory purpose as the touchstone of equal protection analysis).  
 90  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). 
 91  481 U.S. 279. 
 92  Id. at 299, 313. 
 93  Id. at 293. 
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rejected his claim, noting that statistical disparities could only provide 
proof of discrimination in limited contexts.94  Importantly, however, 
the deficiency in McCleskey’s allegation was not substantive, but 
procedural, in nature.  The proffered study could not provide 
evidence of illicit racial considerations in McCleskey’s case itself.95  
Throughout its analysis, the Court made clear that his trial would 
have been constitutionally deficient if racial considerations had 
actually played a role.96  In doing so, the Court provided a contrast 
between substantive and procedural considerations.  Though the 
Baldus study alone would be evidentially insufficient to prove a 
constitutional violation in any given case, including McCleskey’s, the 
Court never actually rejected the substance of the alleged 
discrimination.97  That is, unconstitutional racial considerations had 
likely played a role in many of the cases involved in the study, but 
because of the impossibility of isolating these incidents, any equal 
protection claim based solely on the Baldus study would be 
unsustainable. 
McCleskey highlights the difficulty of proving intent in a specific 
case, and this evidentiary requirement is no less stringent after cases 
such as Ricci.  Because Ricci involved an admission of racial 
motivations, the substantive component of discriminatory intent was 
the only portion at issue.  This holds true for any challenge to an 
explicit racial classification, including any race-conscious remedy 
cases.  For this reason, Ricci will do little to lighten the plaintiff’s 
burden in bringing a direct claim of intentional racial discrimination 
based on action not facially racial or admittedly race-driven. 
Though race-conscious remedies do entail their own procedural 
and evidentiary obstacles—which will be discussed at length—they do 
not require that the remedy be linked to a specific discriminatory 
action.  With this different standard of proof, it becomes possible to 
demonstrate certain types of decisions that are unquestionably racial 
in nature—that have no other explanation besides race.  Race-based 
decision-making can be identified in a variety of contexts, and this 
racially-driven treatment can serve as a starting point for a compelling 
interest based on remedying that discrimination.  In the educational 
sphere, at least two examples of race-based decision-making demand 
 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. at 297. 
 96  See id. at 292–93 (requiring McCleskey to show evidence sufficient to “support 
an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence”). 
 97  See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292–99. 
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attention and warrant the application of a race-conscious remedy.  
These specific and identifiable types of constitutional violations are 
“failure to warn”98 and “positive feedback bias.”99 
D. Race-Based Decision-Making in the Educational Sphere 
The Court’s expression of intentional discrimination in Ricci and 
Bray holds importance partially due to the contemporary 
understanding of the ways in which race commonly becomes the 
determinative factor in individual decision-making.  Studies have 
shown that the treatment of Blacks and Whites often differs 
significantly in many areas of society, such as criminal justice,100 
medical care,101 employment,102 and education.103  For many Black 
men and women, their race becomes the catalyzing factor in a 
decision not based in malice, but which causes harm that is no less 
real.104  In the educational context, there is ample research that 
demonstrates the prevalence of race-based decision-making, but two 
studies provide the most easily cognizable instances of such racially-
motivated disparate treatment—the “failure to warn” and “positive 
feedback bias” studies.  Each of these reports presents a form of race-
based decision-making within the Court’s understanding of the term, 
and discusses the dangers of decisions that are so clearly precipitated 
by race. 
1. “Failure to Warn” 
In the “failure to warn” study, researchers presented nearly 200 
academic advisors with a scenario in which they were asked to counsel 
a student who had proposed an exceedingly difficult course of 
study.105  As predicted, the counselors were far less likely to give 
appropriate warnings about the plan’s difficulty to Black students 
than to White students.106  The significant racial disparities in the 
advice received means that, for at least some Black students 
encountering this discrimination in the real world, their race likely 
 
 98  Crosby & Monin, supra note 22. 
 99  Harber, supra note 22. 
 100  See, e.g., Baldus & Cole, supra note 20. 
 101  See, e.g., Sabin et al., supra note 21. 
 102  See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 19. 
 103  See, e.g., Harber, supra note 22; Crosby & Monin, supra note 22. 
 104  See, e.g., Harber, supra note 22 (suggesting that false-positive feedback given to 
Black students can have serious repercussions on their learning). 
 105  Crosby & Monin, supra note 22, at 665. 
 106  Id. at 669. 
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determined whether or not they were adequately prepared for, or 
warned against, a course of study that was likely too difficult for them.  
The authors of the study determined that the disparate treatment 
likely arose out of a desire not to appear prejudiced; warning against 
the course of study might signal lower expectations for Black 
students, and as a result, the advisors held back their honest opinion 
of the academic plan.107  The study ruled out the possibility that the 
advisors were deliberately “setting Black students up for failure”108—a 
motive which would be the product of actual racial animus—but the 
lack of an invidious purpose does not remove failure-to-warn from 
the realm of intentional discrimination.  A decision motivated by a 
desire to avoid appearing prejudiced is quintessentially race-based, 
and this sort of race-based decision-making results in the intentional 
discrimination of every Black student who obtains poorer advice than 
he or she would have otherwise received. 
 
2. “Positive Feedback Bias” 
In an earlier study, researchers recognized the existence of 
racially skewed feedback on poorly written student essays.109  This 
form of identified racial discrimination is manifested through the 
positive feedback bias—a phenomenon where White teachers are less 
likely be critical of Black or Hispanic students’ work—thus inhibiting 
those students’ educational advancement.110  A recent study outlines 
the dangers of such racial discrimination: 
Although a “positive bias” may sound benign, it could pose 
serious liabilities.  Minority students who chronically receive 
positively biased feedback may be misled about where, and 
how ardently, to exert their efforts.  These students could 
also be deprived of the academic challenge that promotes 
advancement [citation omitted].  Unduly positive feedback 
demoralizes all students, causing them to regard praise as a 
consolation for deficient ability.  Positively biased feedback 
can also erode minority learners’ trust in legitimate praise, 
causing them to wonder whether it reflects their personal 
achievements or their racial backgrounds.  For all these 
reasons, the positive bias may undermine minority 
 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Harber, supra note 22. 
 110  Id. 
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learners.111 
 
The study sampled the behavior of 113 public school teachers, 
aggregated the rates of positive and negative comments along racial 
lines, and found that participants were significantly more likely to 
provide positive feedback to Black students, and less likely to give 
negative feedback.112 
Like the failure-to-warn study, positive feedback bias can only be 
explained along racial lines, and thus it demonstrates that teachers 
often treat Black and White students differently, solely because of 
their race.113  Unlike the failure-to-warn study, however, positive 
feedback bias is potentially rooted in actual lowered expectations of 
Black students.114  Whether the unequal treatment is caused by 
lowered expectations, or out of a similar desire to avoid appearing 
prejudiced, the disparities result from race-based decision-making.  
For the Black students that suffer from the effects of positive 
feedback bias, their treatment is determined exclusively by their race, 
and this intentional discrimination can have serious ramifications for 
their ability to learn and grow as writers. 
3. Applying the Ricci Standard 
Positive feedback bias and failure-to-warn are simply two 
examples of the ways in which entrenched racial bias and racial 
anxiety can make the race of a student, or anyone else, outcome-
determinative.  Although a particular decision-maker is not likely to 
be acting out of a desire to harm Black students, the resultant 
disparate treatment is the product of race-based decision-making, 
and therefore constitutes intentional discrimination.115  The reasons 
underlying the differential treatment are irrelevant, as made clear by 
Ricci.116  By letting the race of a student affect their treatment of that 
student, teachers and counselors have violated the rights of at least 
some Black students. 
Indeed, the facts of Ricci are highly analogous to those situations 
involving failure-to-warn or positive feedback bias.  In each instance, 
the discriminating actor departs from the normal course of action, 
 
 111  Id. (citations omitted). 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579–80 (2009). 
 116  Id. 
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simply due to the race of the individual toward whom he or she is 
acting.  None of the actions are motivated by a desire to harm the 
victims of the discrimination, although in each instance, harm does 
follow from the differential treatment.117  In Ricci, it can hardly be said 
that the City had any intention to cause harm to the White 
firefighters—indeed, the Court explicitly noted that benign or 
benevolent motives were irrelevant.118  Like the White firefighters in 
Ricci, the harm caused to Black students as the result of failure-to-
warn and positive feedback bias is not intentional—it is simply the 
inevitable by-product of race-based decision-making.  Comparable 
race-motivated action can be identified in a number of contexts—
educational or otherwise—and consistent racial disparities make 
apparent the reality that, for a substantial number of Black men and 
women, their race determines the way in which they are treated.119 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS OF RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES 
A. Level of Scrutiny for Race-Conscious Policies 
In her plurality opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
Justice O’Connor outlined the difficulty of reaching a proper level of 
scrutiny for race-based governmental action designed to benefit 
historically disadvantaged groups.120  Bakke was the first case to 
address the argument that strict scrutiny should only apply to 
classifications that disadvantage discreet and insular minorities, and it 
rejected this contention, concluding that “[r]acial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the 
 
 117  The nature of the resulting harm matters only for determining the scope of 
the redressable injury, and not for determining whether there was intentional 
discrimination in the first place. 
 118  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 579–80. 
 119  It is worth noting at this point, as mentioned above, that the Court’s 
substantive definition of discriminatory intent makes clear that there are numerous 
situations where the prevalence of race-based decision-making leads to constitutional 
violations.  Although the McCleskey Court specified that the Baldus study could not 
provide evidence of a constitutional violation in McCleskey’s individual case, for 
instance, the preceding analysis raises the point that the study does, in fact, 
demonstrate the potential presence of widespread constitutional violations of Black 
defendants in the Georgia criminal justice system.  Even if the proper answer to these 
violations is not a race-conscious remedy, the existence of equal protection violations 
in such a significant number of criminal trials should raise serious concerns about 
racial justice in our current criminal system, and should catalyze a discussion on the 
possible remedies to the problem. 
 120  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218 (1995). 
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most exacting judicial examination.”121  Bakke, however, did not 
produce an opinion for the Court, and the level of scrutiny applied 
by Justice Powell did not constitute binding precedent.122  In Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, a case considering race-based 
considerations in teacher lay-off plans, the Court again applied strict 
scrutiny.123  For a second time, however, the Court was only able to 
produce a plurality opinion.124  It was not until City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co. that “the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state 
and local governments.”125 
In Adarand itself, the Court determined that this principle 
should be broadened so that “all racial classifications, imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”126  Under strict scrutiny, 
racial classifications must be supported by a compelling 
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest.127  As explained by Justice O’Connor, however, strict scrutiny 
does not speak to the merits of a particular law, but rather is used “to 
differentiate between permissible and impermissible governmental 
use of race.”128  Indeed, Adarand makes clear that the fundamental 
purpose of strict scrutiny is to take relevant differences into 
account.129 
B. Race-Conscious Admissions and the Emphasis on Diversity 
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
In Bakke, a White male brought suit against the University of 
California at Davis (“UC”) after being twice rejected for admission to 
UC’s medical school.130  Bakke challenged the use of a special 
admissions program at the school, which reserved 16 out of 100 
 
 121  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
 122  Id. at 269. 
 123  476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986). 
 124  Id. at 269. 
 125  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989)). 
 126  Id. at 227. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. at 228. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1978). 
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available seats for “disadvantaged” applicants.131  The special 
admissions program was administered by an entirely separate 
committee, which narrowed the pool of disadvantaged applicants and 
submitted recommendations to the general admissions committee.132  
The general admissions committee “could reject recommended 
special candidates for . . . specific deficiencies” but special candidates 
continued to be recommended until the proscribed number of 
applicants were admitted.133  Over the course of four years, sixty-three 
minority students gained admissions through the special program, 
and although many disadvantaged Whites applied, none were 
admitted through this program.134  Further, there was evidence that in 
at least one year, only members of designated racial groups were even 
considered for special admission.135 
In over 150 pages worth of opinions, the Supreme Court 
reached only two true holdings: (1) that the admissions program was 
unlawful and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and (2) that 
not all considerations of race in university admissions would be 
unconstitutional.136  As noted above, Bakke was unable to produce an 
opinion for the Court,137 but in announcing the judgment, Justice 
Powell provided some guidance for courts moving forward.  In turn, 
Justice Powell considered the four proffered justifications for the 
school’s admissions program: 
(i) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in medical schools and in the medical 
profession; (ii) countering the effects of societal 
discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians 
who will practice in communities currently underserved; 
and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from 
an ethnically diverse student body.138 
Justice Powell quickly dispensed with arguments (i) and (iii), as 
well as the school’s argument that it possessed authority to counter 
the effects of societal discrimination.139  Yet he found that the fourth 
goal asserted by the school, the attainment of a diverse student body, 
 
 131  Id. at 274–75. 
 132  Id. at 275. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. at 275–76. 
 135  Id. at 276. 
 136  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271–72. 
 137  Id. at 272. 
 138  Id. at 306. 
 139  Id. at 310. 
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was “clearly . . . a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of 
higher education.”140  The diversity interest, as laid out by Justice 
Powell, is rooted in the academic freedom concepts embodied in the 
First Amendment.141  After finding the school’s diversity argument 
compelling, Justice Powell nonetheless concluded that the special 
program’s use of race to set aside a specified percentage of seats in 
the incoming class was not “necessary to promote a substantial state 
interest.”142 
The language in the opinion, however, clearly expressed the 
possibility that a “properly devised admissions program involving the 
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin” could 
legitimately address the school’s compelling interest in diversity.143  
Indeed, Justice Powell devoted a significant passage to exploring the 
more holistic admissions methods of Harvard College, where “race or 
ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s 
file, yet does not insulate the individual from comparison with all 
other candidates for the available seats.”144  In this way, the admissions 
policy would be able to treat each applicant as an individual, rather 
than simply a member of a particular racial group.145 
2. Grutter v. Bollinger 
Grutter involved a challenge to the holistic, race-conscious 
admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School (the “Law 
School”).146  Barbara Grutter, a White Michigan resident, applied to 
the Law School with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score and was placed 
on the waiting list but ultimately denied admission to the Law 
School.147  Grutter alleged that her Fourteenth Amendment rights 
were violated because race was used by the Law School as a 
“predominant” factor, effectively giving minority students a 
significantly greater chance of admission.148 
During a bench trial below, the Director of Admissions for the 
Law School testified that “he did not direct his staff to admit a 
 
 140  Id. at 311–12. 
 141  Id. at 312 (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body.”). 
 142  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. at 316–17. 
 145  Id. at 318. 
 146  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311–15. 
 147  Id. at 316. 
 148  Id. at 317. 
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particular percentage or number of minority students, but rather to 
consider the applicant’s race along with all other factors.”149  The 
goal, according to the Director, was to ensure the admission of “a 
critical mass of underrepresented minority students . . . so as to 
realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”150  “Critical 
mass” was further explained to equal “meaningful numbers” or 
“meaningful representation,” so that minority students were able “to 
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated.”151  After the 
District Court declared the admissions policy unlawful, and the Sixth 
Circuit reversed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue of “[w]hether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify 
the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission 
to public universities.”152 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit, declaring that 
colleges and universities “ha[ve] a compelling interest in attaining a 
diverse student body.”153  The Court deferred to “[t]he Law School’s 
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational 
mission[,]” and the claim that diversity “yield[s] educational 
benefits . . . .”154  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor noted that 
such a policy of diversity “promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ 
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables students to 
better understand persons of different races,’” but importantly does 
not rely “on any belief that minority students always (or even 
consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any 
issue.”155  The Court accepted the Law School’s determination “based 
on its experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling 
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student 
body.”156 
After finding that the Law School had demonstrated a 
 
 149  Id. at 318. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321–22. 
 153  Id. at 328, 343–44.  Importantly, the Court accepted without question that 
remedying past discrimination can provide an interest sufficiently compelling to pass 
muster under strict scrutiny.  Id.  (“[W]e have never held that the only governmental 
use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 154  Id. at 328. 
 155  Id. at 330, 333. 
 156  Id. at 333. 
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compelling interest, the Court applied the tailoring requirements of 
strict scrutiny to the admissions policy.157  “To be narrowly tailored, a 
race-conscious admissions program . . . must be ‘flexible enough to 
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same 
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them 
the same weight.’”158  The Court found that “the Law School engages 
in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, 
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might 
contribute to a diverse educational environment.”159 
In contrast, a race-conscious admissions policy operating as a 
quota system or placing minority applicants on a separate admissions 
track will not fulfill the narrow tailoring requirements of strict 
scrutiny.160  Indeed, on the very same day Grutter was announced, the 
Court decided a companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, in which the 
University of Michigan’s race-conscious undergraduate admissions 
policy was found unconstitutional because it was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve the university’s diversity interest.161  There, the 
admissions office utilized a point system to admit applicants and 
automatically awarded twenty points to every underrepresented 
minority applicant, which “ha[d] the effect of making ‘the factor of 
race . . . decisive’ for virtually every minimally qualified 
underrepresented minority applicant.”162 
Although “narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative[,]” the Grutter Court found that 
the Law School “sufficiently considered workable . . . alternatives.”163  
Finally, the Court found that “the Law School’s race-conscious 
admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority 
applicants.”164  Because of the Law School’s “individualized inquiry 
into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants,” the 
admissions program fulfilled this additional requirement of narrow 
tailoring.165 
 
 157  Id. 
 158  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
315, 317 (1978)). 
 159  Id. at 337. 
 160  Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318). 
 161  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003). 
 162  Id. at 272 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). 
 163  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40. 
 164  Id. at 341. 
 165  Id. 
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C. The Compelling Interest in Remedying Identified Discrimination 
Remedying the effects of discrimination through racial 
classifications often arises in the hiring and contracting contexts.166  
As outlined above, race-conscious admissions programs have relied 
almost exclusively upon the diversity interest for justification.  After 
Justice Powell discussed at length the merits of UC’s diversity 
argument in Bakke, the Grutter Court considered only the educational 
benefits of diversity as a compelling interest supporting the use of 
race in admissions, because it was the only justification proffered by 
the Law School.167  Ostensibly because Grutter sanctioned the 
appropriateness of the diversity interest, this eventually became the 
sole instrument by which colleges and universities defended their 
race-conscious policies.  The results of this narrowed focus are 
evident—although the Fisher case originates from a state that bitterly 
opposed and openly defied federally mandated desegregation,168 and 
from a university that was forced to racially integrate itself,169 nowhere 
in UT’s brief to the Supreme Court does the school attempt to justify 
its race-conscious policy on a basis other than diversity.170 
When a governmental entity such as a state university does seek 
to remedy discriminatory effects by employing race in its admissions 
process, however, Bakke articulated two clear guideposts: (1) the State 
has an important interest in ameliorating or eliminating the effects of 
identified discrimination; and (2) remedying “societal 
discrimination” is too amorphous a concept of injury, and cannot 
support the government’s use of race.171  In striking down UC’s 
“societal discrimination” justification, Justice Powell communicated 
discomfort with the concept’s unchecked ability to reach agelessly 
into the past, and the ideological nature of a classification established 
to “aid[] persons perceived as relatively victimized groups.”172  
 
 166  See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995). 
 167  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 168  Arnoldo De León & Robert A. Calvert, Segregation, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL 
ASS’N, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pks01 (last visited Feb. 
27, 2014). 
 169  See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 170  See Brief for Respondent, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 
6146835. 
 171  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 172  Id. 
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Further, Justice Powell observed that the mission of a university or 
college is education, and it is therefore incompetent to make broader 
policy decisions.173  Bakke, therefore, can be more effectively viewed as 
establishing three primary principles for schools asserting an interest 
in remedying discrimination through race-conscious admissions: (1) 
the discrimination must be identified; (2) the effects must be tangible 
and current; and (3) the school must be acting within its institutional 
competency. 
Justice Powell’s limited guidance in his Bakke opinion establishes 
a helpful legal foundation for remedially focused admissions policies, 
but falls short of providing a standard by which these programs can 
be measured.  Due to the contemporary focus on diversity in 
justifying race-conscious admissions policies, it is helpful to explore 
the ways in which the Supreme Court has addressed these racial 
distinctions in contexts outside the educational sphere.  Three 
analogous areas provide the most useful guidance: hiring, 
contracting, and districting. 
The Court’s decision in Wygant reiterated Bakke’s view that 
“societal discrimination is insufficient and over expansive” as a 
justification for race-based distinctions.174  Although the burden never 
shifts from the challengers to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of 
the program, it is crucial that the defendant provide evidentiary 
support that its race-conscious remedy was necessary.175  A race-
conscious remedy is not warranted unless there is a “strong basis in 
evidence” that there have been constitutional or statutory violations, 
and therefore a state actor must provide sufficient evidence to justify 
such a conclusion.176  Wygant, despite striking down the use of race in 
making lay-off decisions,177 nonetheless reinforced the Court’s clear 
grant of permission for the rectification of discriminatory effects 
through racial considerations in the appropriate contexts.178 
J.A. Croson Co. was decided just three years after Wygant, and the 
Court again struck down a governmental use of race while 
 
 173  Id. at 309 (“[A] governmental body must have the authority and capability to 
establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified 
discrimination.”). 
 174  476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). 
 175  Id. at 277–78. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. at 283. 
 178  Id. at 280–81 (“We have recognized . . . that in order to remedy the effects of 
prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account.”) (quoting 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980)). 
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reaffirming its belief that certain race-conscious measures are indeed 
permissible.179  In Croson, the Court faced a minority set-aside 
program for government contractors, and negotiated a middle 
ground between two “stark alternatives”: (1) the challenger’s claim 
that “any race-based remedial efforts [must be limited] to eradicating 
the effects of [the state actor’s] own prior discrimination”; and (2) 
the government’s claim that it “enjoys sweeping legislative power to 
define and attack the effects of prior discrimination in its local 
construction industry.”180  Thus, the Court was tasked with 
determining the extent to which a public entity could draw upon 
private discrimination as legal support for an affirmative race-
conscious remedy. 
Although the set-aside quota was struck down—because 
Richmond failed to make findings that provided a “strong basis in 
evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary”181—the 
Court clarified the circumstances under which a public entity may 
employ an affirmative consideration of race in response to private 
discrimination.182  The Court stated unambiguously that a state or 
local entity possesses the authority to “eradicate the effects of private 
discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction,” so long as such 
discrimination is identified with sufficient particularity.183  Thus, if a 
public entity has become a “passive participant” in a system of racial 
exclusion within a particular industry or segment of society, the Court 
“think[s] it clear that the [entity] could take affirmative steps to 
dismantle such a system.”184 
The Court nevertheless found that Richmond’s policy fell 
outside the permissible scope of race-conscious remedies, largely 
because of its sole reliance on race-based statistical disparities.185  
Although gross statistical disparities alone may constitute the level of 
proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory 
effect, these statistics become meaningless when special qualifications 
are needed for a particular job.186  Regardless of the Court’s decision 
on the merits of Richmond’s arguments, it made clear that 
 
 179  488 U.S. 469, 500, 509 (1989). 
 180  Id. at 486. 
 181  Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). 
 182  Id. at 491–92. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501. 
 186  Id. 
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“[n]othing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking 
action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its 
jurisdiction.”187 
The culmination of these hiring/contracting cases came in 
Adarand, in which the Court re-emphasized that strict scrutiny is not 
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”188  In establishing a uniform 
application of strict scrutiny to any governmental use of race, the 
majority made clear that the fundamental purpose of such an 
exacting inquiry is to “take ‘relative differences’ into account.”189  
Strict scrutiny “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any 
particular law;” indeed, its entire point is to distinguish between 
“permissible and impermissible governmental use of race.”190 
In Shaw v. Reno (“Shaw I”), a case involving race-conscious 
districting in order to promote minority representation, the Court 
noted that it had previously recognized a compelling interest in 
eradicating the effects of racial discrimination.191  Shaw v. Hunt (“Shaw 
II”), rising from the same set of circumstances, provided perhaps the 
most useful framework for evaluating racial distinctions designed to 
remedy the effects of past or present racial discrimination.192 
For that interest to rise to the level of a compelling state 
interest, it must satisfy two conditions: First, the 
discrimination must be identified discrimination.  While the 
States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when 
they possess evidence of past or present discrimination, they 
must identify that discrimination, public or private, with 
some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.  
A generalized assertion of past discrimination in a 
particular industry or region is not adequate because it 
provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the 
precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.  Accordingly, 
an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is 
not a compelling interest.  Second, the institution that 
makes the racial distinction must have had a strong basis in 
evidence to conclude that remedial action was necessary, 
 
 187  Id. at 509. 
 188  515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 
(1980)). 
 189  Id. at 228 
 190  Id. at 228, 230. 
 191  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (citing J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 491–
93) (“Shaw I”). 
 192  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996) (“Shaw II”). 
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before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.193 
D. Establishing the Compelling Interest 
Shaw II provides a helpful two-step framework for evaluating 
race-conscious remedies, and the hiring/contracting cases supply 
additional principles that can further clarify the precise scope of the 
interest.  Taken together, these cases reveal that, in order to establish 
a compelling interest in remedying identified discrimination, a state 
actor must demonstrate: (1) identifiable and particularized findings 
of intentional discrimination—the allegations of discrimination must 
not be amorphous or ideological,194 and the alleged discrimination 
must rise to the level of a constitutional or statutory violation;195 as 
well as (2) a strong basis in evidence for  the necessity of remedial 
action—the scope of the injury must be quantifiable,196 and the 
remedy must be responsive to the discriminatory effects.197 
1. Identifiable and Particularized Findings of Intentional 
Discrimination 
As the first step in demonstrating a compelling interest sufficient 
to support a race-conscious remedy, a public entity must sufficiently 
identify the predicate discrimination.  Racial preferences are 
permissible only pursuant to “judicial, legislative, or administrative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”198  Unless the extent 
of the injury and the consequent remedy are adequately defined, the 
rights-based remedy will be converted into a privilege for the benefit 
of any group perceived as relatively disadvantaged.199 
At the core of the Supreme Court’s requirement of identified 
discrimination is the concern that the possible remedies for societal 
discrimination “are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless 
in their ability to affect the future.”200  By requiring “particularized 
findings,” the Court can ensure that a race-conscious remedy is not 
ideological in nature, but actually attempts to alleviate 
 
 193  Id. 
 194  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. at 307–08. 
 197  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (holding that 
generalized assertions of discrimination are insufficient because it cannot otherwise 
be assured that the remedy addresses present and actual effects of discrimination). 
 198  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted). 
 199  Id. at 307–08, 310. 
 200  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). 
WINTERMUTE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2014  12:07 PM 
2014] COMMENT 587 
 
constitutionally-recognized discrimination.201  For this reason, mere 
generalizations or amorphous claims of discrimination fail as a 
predicate for race-based relief.202  If a state actor wishes to rely on 
statistical comparisons, it must be accompanied by the reasonable 
inference that such disparities are actually reflective of alleged 
discrimination and not solely the result of non-discriminatory 
explanations.203  Conclusory allegations of racial discrimination in a 
particular industry are similarly misguided because they fail to assist 
in defining the scope of the injury actually suffered by a minority 
group.204 
Further, a race-based remedy can only arise pursuant to findings 
of constitutional or statutory violations,205 and under the Equal 
Protection Clause, only intentional discrimination is considered 
unconstitutional.206  As discussed in Part II, this intentional 
discrimination must be the product of “race-based decisionmaking”—
it must amount to disparate treatment motivated by race.207  The 
discrimination need not be fueled by a desire to cause harm, 
however, as long as it is racially-driven.208 
2. Necessity of Remedial Action 
To fully establish a compelling interest in remedying identified 
discrimination, “the institution that makes the racial distinction must 
have had a strong basis in evidence to conclude that remedial action 
was necessary.”209  Although the challengers of a racial classification 
retain the burden of proving the policy unconstitutional, a public 
entity must provide sufficient evidence in order for the trial court to 
factually determine whether the entity had a strong basis for 
concluding that the classification was warranted.210  This burden of 
production assists the judicial determination that the classification is 
truly responsive to a remedial purpose.211  Without this evidence, a 
trial court will be unable to determine whether the race-conscious 
 
 201  Id. at 275–76. 
 202  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989). 
 203  Id. at 501–03. 
 204  Id. at 500, 503. 
 205  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
 206  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1986). 
 207  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009). 
 208  Id. at 579–80. 
 209  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996). 
 210  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S 267, 277–78 (1986). 
 211   Id. 
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policy is justified, and the distinction will be struck down as 
unconstitutional.212 
In demonstrating “a strong basis in evidence” that a race-
conscious remedy is necessary, an actor must show that the remedy is 
responsive to the discrimination identified.  In establishing the 
responsiveness of the remedy to the injury, the actor asserting the 
interest must define the extent of the injury demanding redress,213 
which amounts to a requirement that the discriminatory effects are 
quantifiable.  Otherwise, a race-conscious remedy may be “timeless in 
[its] ability to affect the future”214 because it will be impossible to 
show that the effects have dissipated or diminished over time and that 
the remedy is no longer justified.  At its core, quantifying the alleged 
discriminatory effects ensures that the race-conscious remedy 
matches its precipitating effects and thus avoids becoming 
“insufficient [or] over expansive.”215 
Likewise, by ensuring that remedies address only measurable 
effects of identified discrimination, those remedies will not be 
“ageless in their reach into the past.”216  By requiring evidence that 
the remedy is responsive to measurable effects of identified 
discrimination, the Court seeks to remove the possibility that a public 
entity is utilizing a suspect classification that “aids persons perceived 
as members of relatively victimized groups,”217 and instead attempts to 
retain its focus upon vindicating the legal rights of the victims of 
actual discrimination.  A race-conscious remedy that is responsive to 
currently-measured effects of identified discrimination, rather than 
designating any particular “creditor or . . . debtor race,”218 actually 
accounts for the discriminatory effects suffered by minorities today in 
the markets for education or labor. 
IV. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz, White Texas residents, 
 
 212  Id. 
 213  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–08 (1978). 
 214  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. 
 217  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
 218  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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were denied undergraduate admission to the University of Texas at 
Austin for the class entering in 2008.219  They filed suit, alleging that 
UT’s admissions policies discriminated against them on the basis of 
race in violation of their right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights statutes.220  The 
admissions program at issue involved the use of race in a manner 
confined to the specifications laid out in Grutter.221  The challenge to 
the “otherwise-plain legality of the Grutter-like admissions program” 
arose from the “intimate ties and ultimate confluence” of the race-
conscious admissions initiative and the Top Ten Percent Law, a 
“legislatively-mandated parallel diversity initiative that guarantees 
admission to Texas students in the top ten percent of their high 
school class.”222 
Until 1996, students were selected for admission to UT based 
upon two considerations: (1) an Academic Index (AI), which 
computed the relative academic success of each applicant using 
numbers such as the applicant’s high school class rank and 
standardized test scores; and (2) race.223  Race was employed because 
school officials believed using AI alone would produce unacceptably 
low diversity levels, and although it was unclear how exactly race was 
considered, “it is undisputed that race was considered directly and 
was often a controlling factor in admission.”224  In 1996, however, 
Hopwood v. Texas struck down the use of race-conscious admissions at 
UT, holding that diversity was not a compelling government 
interest.225  After the decision, UT began utilizing a Personal 
Achievement Index (PAI), which strived to identify and award 
applicants “whose merit . . . was not adequately reflected by their class 
rank and test scores.”226  The PAI and many other facially “race-
neutral” policies implemented by UT in response to Hopwood still 
remain in effect.227 
Also in response to Hopwood, and because other admissions 
policies were unsuccessful at achieving meaningful diversity, the 
Texas legislature enacted the Top Ten Percent Law—still in effect 
 
 219  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 220  Id. 
 221  Id. at 216. 
 222  Id. at 216–17. 
 223  Id. at 222. 
 224  Id. at 222–23. 
 225  Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 226  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 223. 
 227  Id. 
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today—which mandated admission into any state university for a high 
school senior graduating in the top ten percent of his or her class.228  
Because this program targeted relatively high-performing students in 
low-income and often racially diverse school districts, the Top Ten 
Percent Law succeeded in increasing minority enrollment over a 
period of time.229  The freshman class of 2004, the last one admitted 
before the Grutter-like policy was implemented, was comprised of 
4.5% African-Americans, 16.9% Hispanics, and 17.9% Asian-
Americans.230 
In 2004, following the announcement in Grutter v. Bollinger, UT 
began utilizing an applicant’s race as an element of his or her PAI 
score, which the admissions committee would review if an applicant 
was not admitted under the Top Ten Percent plan, and if his or her 
score was not high enough to be automatically admitted nor too low 
to be presumptively denied.231  Race, included simply as part of UT’s 
holistic PAI system, is never considered alone, and is not affected by 
the incoming class’s relative racial proportions.232  At the district court 
level, the judge found no problem with this holistic, Grutter-like 
approach and granted UT summary judgment.233 
B. Fifth Circuit Opinion 
Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
district court, holding that UT undertook a “serious, good faith 
consideration” before resorting to race-conscious measures, and that 
the admissions program was faithful to the requirements of Grutter.234  
In comparing UT’s use of race to that of the law school in Grutter, the 
Fifth Circuit noted: 
Grutter teaches that so long as a university considers race in 
a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a 
quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of 
deference to the university’s good faith determination that 
certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve 
the education benefits of diversity, including attaining 
critical mass in minority enrollment.235 
 
 228  Id. at 223–24. 
 229  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. at 227–28. 
 232  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 230. 
 233  Id. at 217. 
 234  Id. at 246–47. 
 235  Id. at 233. 
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The Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny within the unique 
context of race-conscious university admissions, with due regard to “a 
university’s academic freedom and the complex educational 
judgments made when assembling a broadly diverse student body.”236  
The Fifth Circuit then turned to the challengers’ three arguments for 
invalidating UT’s race-conscious admissions policy: (1) UT’s plan 
amounted to “racial balancing”; (2) the school had failed to consider 
race-neutral alternatives such as the Top Ten Percent Law; and (3) 
minority enrollment had already surpassed critical mass.237 
The court of appeals rejected the challengers’ first argument 
because UT “has never established a specific number, percentage, or 
range of minority enrollment . . . nor does it award any fixed number 
of points to minority students in  a way that impermissibly values race 
for its own sake.”238  Next, the circuit court found that the Top Ten 
Percent Law was not a constitutionally mandated race-neutral 
alternative to achieving diversity because it “comes at a high cost and 
is at best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that 
diversity is intended to achieve.”239  Lastly, the appellate court was 
unable to determine that UT had reached critical mass; although a 
plaintiff may produce evidence tending to show that a university is no 
longer pursuing the educational benefits of diversity in good faith, 
the court found that the various benchmarks and statistics offered by 
the plaintiffs were insufficient to establish such a proposition.240 
C. Supreme Court Decision 
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court 
vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case, holding 
that the panel did not properly apply strict scrutiny to UT’s race-
conscious policy.241  Specifically, the Court found that improper 
deference was given to the university in analyzing the narrow 
tailoring requirement of the program.242  By presuming that UT had 
acted in “good faith” and placing the burden on the petitioner to 
rebut that presumption, the Fifth Circuit had erred as a matter of 
 
 236  Id. at 234. 
 237  Id. 
 238  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 235. 
 239  Id. at 242. 
 240  Id. at 245. 
 241  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
 242  Id. 
WINTERMUTE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2014  12:07 PM 
592 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:557 
 
law.243  As a result of the Court’s, the case will be reheard by the court 
of appeals and may continue to carry uncertainties for the future of 
race-conscious admissions in higher education. 
D. Focus on Diversity 
No court, at any level, discussed a justification for UT’s race-
conscious admissions focused upon remedying the effects of 
discrimination.244  The lack of judicial focus on the issue was not 
surprising, considering that the university did not even assert the 
interest.245  Instead, UT opted to place all of its proverbial eggs in the 
diversity basket, and it now risks the invalidation of its admissions 
program if the Fifth Circuit decides that the asserted diversity 
benefits do not outweigh the countervailing concerns. 
The exclusive attention to diversity in the Fisher case is 
understandable, given the Court’s approach in Bakke and Grutter.  In 
Bakke, the school asserted four justifications for its race-conscious 
admissions program, but only the diversity interest was found to be 
potentially compelling enough to support the use of racial 
distinctions.246  Justice Powell never expressed the view that diversity 
would be the only acceptable justification for race-conscious 
admissions—indeed, his rejection of the school’s “societal 
discrimination” argument has few implications for a properly-asserted 
remedial justification—but his apparent embrace of the diversity 
interest provided a tantalizingly simple legal foundation for schools 
wishing to utilize race-conscious admissions.  As a consequence, the 
law school in Grutter asserted only one interest to defend its 
admissions program—obtaining the educational benefits of 
classroom diversity.247  The law school’s reliance upon the diversity 
interest only provided the Grutter Court with occasion to evaluate 
 
 243  Id. The Supreme Court’s approach to narrow tailoring, of course, carries 
implications for whatever interest is asserted by a college or university in support of a 
race-conscious admissions policy. To the extent that Fisher applies specifically to the 
diversity interest, however, the Court’s decision makes the need for a remedial 
interest all the more urgent. 
 244  See id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011); 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 245  See Brief for Respondent, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345, 2012 
WL 3245488. 
 246  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310–12 (1978). Importantly, 
the Court did not foreclose the possibility that race-conscious admissions could be 
implemented as a means of remedying the effects of discrimination—it merely 
forbade the school from attempting to address past “societal discrimination.” 
 247  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–28 (2003). 
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race-conscious admissions within this delimited context.  And 
because Grutter explicitly sanctioned such policies in pursuit of 
classroom diversity, the scope of the debate surrounding race-
conscious admissions policies has become firmly entrenched 
following that decision. 
 
V. REMEDYING RACE-BASED DECISION-MAKING: FISHER RECONSIDERED 
As an alternative to the now-tenuous diversity argument, UT may 
well have asserted an interest in remedying discrimination within its 
state public education system, and may have argued that identifiable 
instances of race-based decision-making justified its holistic 
consideration of race in evaluating incoming candidates.  UT could 
have argued that by utilizing race-conscious admissions, it was simply 
attempting to acknowledge and address the likelihood that a minority 
applicant had suffered a competitive disadvantage as the result of 
intentional discrimination in his or her educational experience.  This 
argument has broad applicability for any school wishing to account 
for racially discriminatory effects within its applicant pool and can 
provide a blueprint for the continued use of race-conscious 
admissions at public colleges and universities, regardless of the fate of 
the diversity interest.  Specifically, UT would need to demonstrate: 
(1) identified forms of race-based decision-making in the Texas 
public school system; (2) quantifiable disparities that result from such 
discrimination; and (3) a “strong basis in evidence” that remedial 
action was necessary to alleviate these racial harms. 
A. Identified Race-Based Decision-Making 
As discussed in Part II, positive feedback bias and failure-to-warn 
provide two examples of race-based decision-making that rise to the 
level of constitutional violations for any Black students or other 
minority students affected.  Those students received disparate 
treatment as the result of their race, and they are entitled to a remedy 
for any harm caused as the result of the discrimination.  In 
attempting to remedy this discrimination through a race-conscious 
admissions process, UT would first need to establish that these race-
based actions were taking place within Texas itself—through studies 
aimed specifically at measuring these racial phenomena and their 
effects solely within Texas and likely on a school-by-school or district-
by-district basis.  By pointing to specific types of discrimination, UT 
can then make reasonable estimations of the scope of the resulting 
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injuries, which together ensure that the use of race is not based upon 
amorphous and generalized allegations of “societal discrimination.” 
B. Quantifiable Effects Measured through Racial Achievement Statistics 
When asserting a compelling interest in remedying identified 
discrimination, the current racial achievement gap in America 
provides a useful context.  The requirement that effects be 
quantifiable means that a public university must define “the extent of 
the injury and the consequent remedy.”248  By simply using the racial 
achievement gap to assess the probable effects of identified 
discrimination, the school is already ensuring that its remedy is not 
“ageless in [its] reach into the past, and timeless in [its] ability to 
affect the future.”249  By tying the injury to currently-measured racial 
disparities, a public entity is placing proper emphasis on the present 
rather than the past and the future. 
But to be sure, the racial achievement gap in America is a 
complex and difficult study.250  Surely, nationwide racial disparities—
without careful context—do not ineludibly connote unconstitutional 
discrimination.  At the very least, however, the clearly identifiable 
forms of state-perpetrated racial discrimination support a strong 
inference that the gap is exacerbated by disparate treatment.  And by 
further inhibiting the growth of Black students, thus enlarging the 
racial achievement gap, public K-12 schools themselves affect the 
applicant pools of public colleges and universities.  While identified 
discrimination manifestly presents the risk of racialized harm, the 
scope of the injury needs to be sufficiently defined in order to 
provide adequate guidance to the entity enacting the remedy.  In 
other words, racial disparities resulting from identified discrimination 
need to be reasonably separated from racial disparities caused by a 
host of economic, geographical, and societal concerns. 
In attempting to identify the scope of injuries created by racial 
discrimination within K-12 schools in Texas, UT’s best evidence 
would be intra-school racial achievement disparities.251  The 
 
 248  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–08. 
 249  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
 250  See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test 
Score Gap in the First Two Years of School, 86 THE REVIEW OF ECON. AND STAT. 447 (2004) 
(listing many possible reasons for the test score gap). 
 251  Such intra-school data on racial achievement is, surprisingly, lacking. A school 
wishing to implement a race-conscious remedy, and wanting to measure the scope of 
the injury through school-specific racial grade and test score breakdowns would likely 
need a greater wealth of data than what is currently available. 
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difference between statewide and intra-school racial disparities is 
apparent—such micro-level analysis of racial achievement gap rules 
out many economic and geographic causes of the gap, and it permits 
a stronger inference that disparities are the result of schools 
providing a racially-biased learning environment. Barring the 
attribution of these disparities to inherent intellectual differences 
between races, there are few other explanations for intra-school racial 
inequality—such disparities would provide a reasonably strong 
measure of the injury from identified discrimination within K-12 
schools themselves. 
By examining the distinctive racial contours of each individual 
school district, UT can appropriately account for the competitive 
racial disadvantages among its applicants and sufficiently ensure that 
it is addressing only those racial effects that are likely caused by 
discriminatory treatment within Texas’s school system.  Limiting the 
analysis of racial achievement statistics to intra-school comparisons 
enhances the probability that a particular college’s race-conscious 
remedy actually fits the injury suffered by local students.  In supplying 
all of these limitations, this approach to measuring identified 
discriminatory effects is sufficiently particular and thus fits within the 
core concerns expressed by the Court. 
C. Necessity of a Race-Conscious Remedy 
Finally, an institution of higher learning is well-equipped to 
demonstrate a “strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary.”252  Consider a university’s 
conclusion—based on studies showing race-based treatment in its 
own state and resulting racial disparities—that race-conscious 
admissions are a necessary response. Its conclusion would seem 
difficult to dispute, considering that the alternative is to force a 
college to become a “passive participant”253 in an educational process 
that systematically depresses the grades and test scores of minority 
students.  Forcing a college or university to assume that the test scores 
and grades of its applicant pool predict educational potential, 
independent of racially discriminatory effects, would compel the 
school to admit an incoming class that is tainted by the effects of 
discrimination.  Moreover, it would exacerbate the injury to already-
disadvantaged minority students and ensure that the state-created 
 
 252  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
 253  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989). 
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barriers to educational opportunity would continue to affect the long-
term success of those individuals. 
While a college or university is not competent to address the 
broad policy implications of identifying and remedying “societal 
discrimination,”254 a carefully crafted race-conscious admissions policy 
considers only those discriminatory effects that arise uniquely within 
an educational context.  Because the scope of the targeted 
discriminatory effects is confined to those injuries resulting in 
competitive disadvantages in pursuing post-secondary opportunities, 
a college has the authority and the institutional competency to define 
the extent of these effects.  Racial discrimination and bias in the 
classroom is not a novel concept for experts in pedagogy, and such 
educators would seemingly be the most qualified actors to respond to 
the effects.  A university’s extensive familiarity with the precise 
contours of its applicant pool places it in the best position to 
ascertain the potential effects of identified racial discrimination, as 
well as any potential shifts which may indicate the lessening of 
discriminatory effects and the consequent need for a race-conscious 
remedy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since Bakke has 
made it more difficult to assert an interest in remedying identified 
discrimination, it has made the interest itself no less compelling.  We 
do not become a post-racial society merely by declaration.  As 
acknowledged by the Court in Adarand, “[t]he unhappy persistence 
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality.”255  A 
college or university is not entitled to afford a preference to a 
minority applicant simply due to his or her membership in relatively 
disadvantaged group.  Rather, a race-conscious remedy becomes 
permissible because many minority applicants are likely to have 
suffered racial hurdles themselves.  The inability of their primary and 
secondary education systems to provide a learning environment free 
from discrimination has hindered their ability to compete for 
admission with members of non-disadvantaged groups. 
The need for colleges and universities to develop an informed 
and remedially-focused affirmative action policy is greater than ever 
 
 254  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978). 
 255  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
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due to the probable implications of the Fisher case.  By placing in 
jeopardy the scope of the interest in pursuing campus diversity, Fisher 
has endangered the entire permissibility of affirmative action in 
college admissions.  Not only does remedying the effects of identified 
discrimination present a viable alternative compelling interest for 
schools wishing to maintain race-conscious admissions policies, it 
fulfills a much broader purpose.  Simply by asserting this compelling 
interest, a college or university is acknowledging that our country’s 
history of race relations is not entirely in the rearview mirror.  It is 
refusing to permit the injudicious notion that race has ceased to 
present unique barriers for minority students seeking to obtain the 
equal opportunities of their White counterparts, or that the state is 
free from blame for these barriers.  Above all, a modest race-based 
remedy for the effects of identified discrimination actually works 
toward removing those barriers. 
 
